David Chalmers
Philosopher of mind whose work frames the debate on AI consciousness and model welfare
A philosopher at NYU best known for naming the hard problem of consciousness. His public arguments about whether language models could ever be conscious are central to the model welfare debate.
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A Mind Cannot Be Smeared Across Time
Michael Timothy Bennett's arXiv paper arguing that whether a machine can be conscious depends on when it computes, not only what. It proves that systems running on strictly sequential hardware cannot instantiate certain unified conscious contents under the "Chord" postulate. Preprint — not peer reviewed.
Why this: Covers consciousness and philosophy of mind too
Could Treating AI as Conscious Make It More Dangerous?
IEEE Spectrum’s October 21, 2026 article by Eliza Strickland covers disagreement about AI model welfare, possible machine consciousness, and whether telling models about identities or rights could affect safety. It presents contrasting research perspectives rather than establishing that current AI models are conscious.
Why this: Also about model welfare
The Brain in the Dark: A Conversation with Karl Friston
Thought Economics interview with neuroscientist Karl Friston on perception, free will, and whether machines can be conscious.
Why this: Also about consciousness
A Philosopher's Guide to AI Welfare
Jeff Sebo (September 17, 2026) on whether AI systems could matter morally: consciousness, sentience and agency are three distinct ways something can count — and in AI, unlike in animals, they may not come as a package.
Why this: Also about consciousness